SØG - mellem flere end 8 millioner bøger:
Viser: Israel's Long War with Hezbollah - Military Innovation and Adaptation under Fire
Israel's Long War with Hezbollah Vital Source e-bog
Raphael D. Marcus
(2018)
Israel's Long War with Hezbollah
Military Innovation and Adaptation under Fire
Raphael D. Marcus
(2018)
Detaljer om varen
- Vital Source searchable e-book (Reflowable pages)
- Udgiver: IGI Global (Oktober 2018)
- ISBN: 9781626166127
The ongoing conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah is now in its fourth decade and shows no signs of ending. Raphael D. Marcus examines this conflict since the formation of Hezbollah during Israel’s occupation of Lebanon in the early 1980s. He critically evaluates events including Israel’s long counterguerrilla campaign throughout the 1990s, the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, the 2006 summer war, and concludes with an assessment of current tensions on the border between Israel and Lebanon related to the Syrian civil war.
Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah is both the first complete military history of this decades-long conflict and an analysis of military innovation and adaptation. The book is based on unique fieldwork in Israel and Lebanon, extensive research into Hebrew and Arabic primary sources, and dozens of interviews Marcus conducted with Israeli defense officials, high-ranking military officers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), United Nations personnel, a Hezbollah official, and Western diplomats. As an expert on organizational learning, Marcus analyzes ongoing processes of strategic and operational innovation and adaptation by both the IDF and Hezbollah throughout the long guerrilla conflict. His conclusions illuminate the dynamics of the ongoing conflict and illustrate the complexity of military adaptation under fire.
With Hezbollah playing an ongoing role in the civil war in Syria and the simmering hostilities on the Israel-Lebanon border, students, scholars, diplomats, and military practitioners with an interest in Middle Eastern security issues, Israeli military history, and military innovation and adaptation can ill afford to neglect this book.
Bookshelf online: 5 år fra købsdato.
Bookshelf appen: ubegrænset dage fra købsdato.
Udgiveren oplyser at følgende begrænsninger er gældende for dette produkt:
Print: -1 sider kan printes ad gangen
Copy: højest -1 sider i alt kan kopieres (copy/paste)
Detaljer om varen
- Hardback: 320 sider
- Udgiver: Georgetown University Press (Oktober 2018)
- ISBN: 9781626166110
This book provides the first comprehensive military history of the decades-long conflict between Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah. It begins in 1985 during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, includes the Second Lebanon War (a.k.a. the July War) in 2006 and aftermath, and brings the story up to the present. Raphael Marcus conducted extensive research in primary sources in both Hebrew and Arabic and conducted dozens of interviews with Israeli military participants. A second contribution of the book is that it assesses both strategic and operational military learning and adaptation by each side, or lack thereof, during the guerilla and counterguerilla campaigns. His conclusions illustrate the complexity and messiness of military adaptation under fire. It tells the story of slow strategic adaptation and disjointed operational adaptation by the Israeli Defense Forces, where civil-military relations, regional and geostrategic factors, institutional dynamics, domestic pressures, and organizational culture each hindered change. An Afterword in the book discusses adaptation on both sides since the 2006 war and Hezbollah's involvement in the war in Syria. Tensions between Israel and Hezbollah have once again heated up in fall 2017, making this a timely book.
Part I: Strategic AdaptationIntroduction to
Part IChapter 1: IDF "Routine Security" and the Evolution of Hezbollah (1985-92)
Chapter 2: Deterrence, Guerrilla Warfare, and the Establishment of the "Rules of the Game" (1993-99)
Chapter 3: A Change in the Strategic Equation: The IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)
Chapter 4: The Erosion of Deterrence, the 2006 War, and the Dahiya Doctrine (2000-17)Conclusion to
Part I
Part II: Operational AdaptationIntroduction to
Part IIChapter 5: The Origins of the RMA in IsraelChapter 6: The RMA in Action: IDF Operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah's Adaptation in the 1990sChapter 7: The Rise of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute and Systemic Operational Design
Chapter 8: The 2006 Lebanon War: Military Adaptation and CounteradaptationChapter 9: The Blame Game: A Reappraisal of the IDF's 2006 Operational ConceptConclusion to
Part II ConclusionsAfterword: Back to the Future: IDF Force Planning and Hezbollah's Military Adaptation in Syria ChronologySelected BibliographyIndexAbout the Author