Hjem

1. Value and Normativity
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Which Evaluations?
1.3 The Idea of Value Theory
1.4 Value and Normativity
1.5 Overview
1.6 Meta-ethical Neutrality
1.7 Value Theory: The Questions
2. Meet the Values: Intrinsic, Final & Co.
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Final and Unconditional Value: Some Philosophical Examples
2.3 Intrinsic Value and Final Value
2.4 The Reduction to Facts
2.5 Intrinsic and Conditional Value
2.6 Elimination of Extrinsic Value?
2.7 Summary
3. The Challenge against Absolute Value
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Geach and Attributive Goodness
3.3 Foot and the Virtues
3.4 Thomson and Goodness in a Way
3.5 Zimmerman's Ethical Goodness
3.6 A Better Reply: Absolute Value and Fitting Attitudes
3.7 Summary
4. Personal Value
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Moore on Good and Good For
4.3 Good For and Fitting Attitudes
4.4 Moore Strikes Back?
4.5 Agent-relative Value
4.6 Impersonal/Personal and Agent-neutral/Agent-relative
4.7 Summary
5. The Chemistry of Value
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Supervenience and Other Relations
5.3 Organic Unities
5.4 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Virtual Value
5.5 Alternatives to Organic Unities: Conditional Value
5.6 Holism and Particularism
5.7 Summary
6. Value Relations
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The Trichotomy Thesis and Incomparability
6.3 A Fitting Attitude Argument for Incomparability
6.4 Against Incomparability: Epistemic Limitations
6.5 Against Incomparability: Parity
6.6 Parity and Choice
6.7 Parity and Incomparability
6.8 Summary
7. How Do I Favour Thee?
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Three Dimensions of Favouring
7.3 Responses to Value: Maximizing
7.4 Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value?
7.5 Summary
8. Value and the Wrong Kind of Reasons
8.1 Introduction
8.2 The Fitting Attitude Account and its Rivals
8.3 The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
8.4 The Structure of the Problem and an Initial Response
8.5 Reasons for What?
8.6 Characteristic Concerns and Shared Reasons
8.7 Circular Path: No-Priority
8.8 Summary